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Abstract 
ABSTRACT 
Importance: A number of strategies and policies have been implemented to mitigate the opioid crisis, 
including state Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMPs) that are used to track and compile 
patient prescription data. Because PDMPs are run independently by states, different characteristics of 
PDMPs can impact success rates of the programs in controlling opioid prescriptions and overdose 
deaths. 
Objective: To assess the association between PDMP operating agency type and opioid prescriptions and 
opioid overdose death rates. 
Research Design: The study utilized time-series data provided by the CDC and KFF, which included 
information for 49 states and Washington D.C. with effective PDMPs. The impact of state operating type 
was analyzed using regressions that controlled for the presence of a mandate. A qualitative portion was 
conducted through an online opt-in survey that was sent out to emergency medicine, pain management, 
and primary care physicians. 
Main Outcome and Measures: The unit of observation was state-years, and the study period was 2006 to 
2016 for opioid prescription rate and 2000 to 2017 for opioid overdose death rates. 
Results: Using opioid prescription rates, PDMPs with health-facing agencies combined with a mandate 
decreased prescriptions by approximately 26 prescriptions per 100 individuals, which was statistically 
significant at the 0.1% level. While most of the specific six agency types also decreased prescription rate, 
most coefficients were not statistically significant. Looking at opioid overdose death, PDMPs with health-
facing agencies showed approximately 6 fewer deaths per 100,000 population, reaching statistically 
significance at the 0.1% level. Similarly, broken down by specific agency type, most of these coefficients 
did not reach similar statistically significant. The qualitative survey revealed that the majority of 
physicians are aware of Pennsylvania’s PDMP operating agency. In addition, these physicians routinely 
check the PDMP for patient prescription information, and 75.5% of participants have changed their 
patients’ prescription plan after viewing the PDMP. 
Conclusions and Relevance: These findings suggest that operating agency type impacts effectiveness of 
PDMPs in controlling for prescription rates and opioid overdose deaths. To maximize impact, health-
facing agencies should implement and operate PDMPs. 
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ABSTRACT 
Importance: A number of strategies and policies have been implemented to mitigate the opioid 
crisis, including state Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMPs) that are used to track and 
compile patient prescription data. Because PDMPs are run independently by states, different 
characteristics of PDMPs can impact success rates of the programs in controlling opioid 
prescriptions and overdose deaths.  
Objective: To assess the association between PDMP operating agency type and opioid 
prescriptions and opioid overdose death rates.  
Research Design: The study utilized time-series data provided by the CDC and KFF, which 
included information for 49 states and Washington D.C. with effective PDMPs. The impact of 
state operating type was analyzed using regressions that controlled for the presence of a mandate. 
A qualitative portion was conducted through an online opt-in survey that was sent out to 
emergency medicine, pain management, and primary care physicians.  
Main Outcome and Measures: The unit of observation was state-years, and the study period was 
2006 to 2016 for opioid prescription rate and 2000 to 2017 for opioid overdose death rates.  
Results: Using opioid prescription rates, PDMPs with health-facing agencies combined with a 
mandate decreased prescriptions by approximately 26 prescriptions per 100 individuals, which 
was statistically significant at the 0.1% level. While most of the specific six agency types also 
decreased prescription rate, most coefficients were not statistically significant. Looking at opioid 
overdose death, PDMPs with health-facing agencies showed approximately 6 fewer deaths per 
100,000 population, reaching statistically significance at the 0.1% level. Similarly, broken down 
by specific agency type, most of these coefficients did not reach similar statistically significant. 
The qualitative survey revealed that the majority of physicians are aware of Pennsylvania’s PDMP 
operating agency. In addition, these physicians routinely check the PDMP for patient prescription 
information, and 75.5% of participants have changed their patients’ prescription plan after viewing 
the PDMP. 
Conclusions and Relevance: These findings suggest that operating agency type impacts 
effectiveness of PDMPs in controlling for prescription rates and opioid overdose deaths. To 
maximize impact, health-facing agencies should implement and operate PDMPs.     
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INTRODUCTION 
The opioid epidemic is one of this country’s most pressing health concerns, affecting public 
health in addition to social and economic welfare. The U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) declared a public health emergency in 2017 and announced accelerated 
appointments of specialized personnel to develop regulations and policy guidelines to address the 
emergency (Haffajee and Frank 2018). Earlier this year, HHS announced it would provide almost 
$2 billion in funding for opioid-specific activities, including to support state and local society 
groups, education, treatment and recovery services, response assistances, and more (Mishra 2019). 
A recent study from researchers Florence, Zhou, Luo, and Xu (2016) conducted by the Centers of 
Disease Control and Prevention estimates an “economic burden” of over $78 billion per year in 
2013, caused specifically by misuse of opioid prescriptions. This accounts for a variety of societal 
implications, including productivity losses, healthcare costs, public health expenditures, legal and 
criminal justice involvement, and addiction treatment. Abuse and misuse of prescription opioids 
has caused over 17,000 drug overdose deaths in 2016 (CDC Wonder 2017), a number that has 
been increasing steadily over the past decade (Figure 1). In addition, approximately 21-29% of 
patients will misuse opioids prescribed for chronic pain (NIDA 2019). Such statistics depict the 
urgency and need of better policymaking in the face of crisis.  
 Opioids are a specific class of drugs that work through activating opioid receptors on nerve 
cells, which block the feelings of pain between the brain and the body (Muldoon 2019). Over the 
past decade, deaths involving opioids have skyrocketed, from just under 10,000 deaths in 1999 to 
more than 42,000 in 2016, as noted by Jones et al. (2018). A few select key reasons can be 
attributed to this increase, starting with a shifting notion that pain, as a medical symptom, was 
highly undertreated. The World Health Organization addressed this undertreatment of pain in its 
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Cancer Pain Monograph in the early 1990s and prompted a rapid progress of pain treatment in 
various types of cancers. However, up to this point, opioids were only treated for cancer pain and 
strictly avoided in chronic pain conditions, with the fear that increasing the length of time a patient 
was on opioid medication was associated with a higher likelihood of abuse or misuse (Rosenblum, 
Marsch, Joseph, and Portenoy 2008). The combination of physicians questioning why opioids were 
only used in high-intensity cancer pain and launch of American Pain Society’s impactful “pain as 
the fifth vital sign” paved the way for opioids to be medically prescribed for chronic non-cancer 
pain treatment, as explained by Morone and Weiner (2013). The Joint Commission, Federation of 
State Medical Boards, and Drug Enforcement Agency all approved measures that encouraged 
opioid prescriptions to adequately manage pain and lessened the regulatory scrutiny over physician 
prescribers (Baker 2017). Concurrently during this time period in 1996, Purdue Pharma released 
and aggressive marketed OxyContin as the first line of treatment for non-malignant, non-cancer 
pain (Van Zee 2009). While OxyContin was designed to provide 12 hours of continuous pain relief, 
the pill could be crushed easily, allowing users to experience an intense high. As a result, 
OxyContin became one of the most commonly abused drugs (Alpert, Evans, Lieber, and Powell 
2019). All of these activities laid the foundation for the dramatic uptake of prescription-based 
opioid for cancer pain, and most importantly, non-cancer chronic pain.  
Opioid Prevention Strategies 
 With this increase in opioid prescription rates, a large focus over the past few years has 
been on prevention and reduction of prescription opioid use. The U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration outlines four key strategies: reducing the harm associated with opioid use, 
decreasing opioid demand, limiting the lawful supply of opioid medications, and influencing 
physicians’ prescribing practices (Gross and Gordon 2019). Harm reduction policies focus on 
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limiting and reducing the level of harm associated with opioid and narcotic use, including 
increased access to naloxone, an opioid antagonist that can reverse the respiratory effects caused 
by overdoses, and clean syringe exchanges (Lynn and Galinkin 2017). Demand-reduction policies 
concentrate on limiting the demand of opioid through substance abuse programs, addiction 
treatment programs, and special medication-assisted treatment programs through FDA-approved 
opioids such as methadone, buprenorphine, and extended-release, injectable naltrexone as 
described by Alderks (2017). While demand-reduction policies can be effective, such efficacy 
relies on those to experience opioid abuse to self-enroll in substance abuse and addiction treatment 
prgrams. However, many believe that the most useful types of programs focus on reducing opioid 
supply and changing prescriber patterns (Bonnie, Ford, and Phillip 2017). Such programs include 
state-run Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs, increased prescriber education and training, 
abuse-deterrent drug reformulations, and additional black box drug warnings to avoid possibility 
of overprescribing, reduce diversion, and discouraging drug misuse (Alpert, Powell, and Pacula 
2017; Clark and Schumacher 2017).  
Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs 
 Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMPs) are one type of supply-side programs 
that focus on changing prescriber programs to reduce opioid supply. Characteristics of PDMPs 
differ across states, as implementation of these programs is on a state-by-state basis. Such features 
that vary across states’ PDMPs include various operational and administrative differences, such as 
the operating agency, levels of drug schedules tracked, data collection and updating frequency, 
mandated physician and prescriber viewing, inter-state data sharing, among other factors (Manasco 
et al. 2016). While the majority of these factors have been studied by a variety of researchers, one 
such operational feature that has been lacking in current research is the impact of the operational 
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agency. There are six different types of agencies that run PDMPs: state Pharmacy Boards, state 
Department of Health, Law Enforcement, Professional Licensing Agency, Substance Abuse 
Agency, and Consumer Protection Agency. Because such agencies have different missions and 
goals, it is important for policymakers and law officials to determine which agency can best run 
the PDMPs and have the greatest impact on limiting prescription opioid access. This paper will 
attempt to quantify the impact operating agency has opioid prescription rates and opioid overdose 
deaths. Because each state is responsible for enforcing their own PDMP, it is important to 
understand specific features of efficient PDMPs to better provide states policy makers with a 
guideline of how they should structure and operate their PDMPs. Given this information, policy 
makers and public health officials can develop more operationally successful PDMPs.  
OVERVIEW OF CURRENT RESEARCH 
 Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMP)s are state-level programs that that collect, 
monitor, and analyze prescription dispensing data submitted by physicians and practitioners. Used 
to support public health efforts in education, research, and abuse prevention, PDMPs have been 
implemented to help physicians track and control certain prescriptions, which is especially useful 
for highly addictive medicines such as opioids (Calvert and Campo-Flores 2016). This prescription 
data is provided to physicians, pharmacists, and health practitioners with the goal of providing 
prescribing entities broader information of a patient’s health history to minimize opioid misuse or 
abuse (Islam and McRae 2014). Such information is also shared with insurance programs, 
healthcare licensure boards, state and federal public health departments, and law enforcement to 
better develop policies and procedures (Figure 2). PDMPs have been utilized in the past in 
reducing prescription drug abuse and diversion, including for narcotics, tranquilizers, and 
stimulants. While these programs serve as information databases, PDMPs do not interfere with 
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appropriate medical use, and PDMPs do not serve as a barrier to necessary prescribing for patients 
with legitimate concerns (Finklea, Sacco, and Bagalman 2014).    
Originated from law enforcement mechanism, PDMPs function as a statewide electronic 
database that stores and analyses prescribing and dispensing data for drugs and medications 
classified as Federal controlled substances (Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services 2016). 
Physicians and dispensers in all medical fields can use this data to both better understand a patient’s 
prescription history, which can act as an informative tool in increasing awareness of highly 
dangerous and active controlled medications (Irvine et al. 2014). With this increase in knowledge, 
physicians and dispensers are generally more motivated to be more mindful in their prescription 
given the medical history of a patient. For example, patients who have taken a Schedule II drug 
for a continuous amount of time may be labeled as high-risk for an opioid-medication, critical 
information that a physician should consider prior to prescribing. In many states, physicians and 
prescribers are mandated to view their respective states’ PDMP prior to prescribing any medication 
as an added cautionary metric, which aims to control who is able to receive opioids. As so, PDMPs 
act as both a check point for patients and prescribers; patients who have long and unusual histories 
of being on certain medications will likely be flagged as high-risk by physicians, and physicians 
who have histories of over-prescribing will also likely be flagged as high-risk by law enforcement 
and other state and federal agencies (Irvine et al. 2014).  
The first PDMP was established by California in 1939, which tracked and monitored 
prescriptions for various schedule II drugs, including morphine, opium, among other medications. 
Hawaii, Illinois, Idaho, and New York followed shortly after. A large number of states enacted 
PDMPs after the passing of the Harold Rogers Prescription Monitoring Program in 1996, which 
provided initial guidelines and funding for states that desired to develop PDMPs (Elder and Pines 
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2018). Currently, 49 states, D.C., and Guam have PDMPs have legislation in place that authorizes 
PDMPs; Missouri is the only state has not implemented a PDMP (Haffajee, Jena, and Weiner 
2015), though the state has attempted to pass program over seven different times. As a result, 
Missouri falls among the top ranked states for overdose rates, opioid prescriptions, and arrests 
related to illegal drug and narcotic use (Weber 2018). A recent article estimated that if Missouri 
were to adopt a PDMP with robust features, overdose deaths would decrease by over 600 per year 
(Patrick, Fry, Jones, and Buntin 2016).  
General Effectiveness of State PDMP Programs 
One of the most important questions surrounding PDMPs focuses on its effectiveness, 
particularly in reducing rates of drug overdoses, opioid-specific overdoses, opioid prescription 
rates, among other metrics. The research, however, is conflicting. Most papers differ on 
methodology, dependent variable metrics, statistical analysis procedures, etc.  
Most high-level analysis on overall effectiveness of PDMPs often find that PDMPs are not 
that impactful. A recent report that focuses on the wide-scale impact of opioid prescription rates 
after implementation of PDMP program found that there is no consistent pattern of discernible 
change through studying four outcome measures: opioid prescribing, opioid diversion and supply, 
opioid misuse, and opioid-related morbidity and mortality (Finley et al. 2017). This variation is 
likely due a large number of factors, variations in study design, methods, inconsistent measures of 
impact across the studies, and measurement of PDMPs across multiple states. In addition to study 
disparities, there are discrepancies in the PDMP design itself; some states update data in their 
PDMPs less frequently, some states mandate physicians to consult with the PDMPs before writing 
prescriptions and other states vary in the responsibility that they place in physicians for mis-
prescribing. All these differences amount variations in accuracy, timeliness, and reliability of the 
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data, which inevitably interferes with the effectiveness of PDMPs. Researchers Paulozzi, 
Kilbourne, and Desai (2011) studied the impact the PDMPs also concluded that implementation 
of PDMPs were not significantly associated with lower rates of opioid overdose mortality or lower 
rates of opioid prescription and consumption through their six-year observational study in the US. 
While potentially an effective way to minimize opioid-related deaths and decrease prescription 
rates, the overall effect of PDMPs appeared to be quite minimal. Similar to many other research 
articles published, the authors ultimately from this study concluded that evidence that PDMP 
implementation affects overdose rates is largely insufficient to firmly conclude its effectiveness; 
select states actually experienced an increase in opioid and heroin abuse rates after implementation 
of PDMPs (Fink et al. 2018). When using drug overdose mortality rates as a unit of measurement, 
researchers Nam, Shea, and Shi (2017) established that PDMPs were not associated with any 
reductions in drug overdose mortality rates and could be actually related to increased use from 
other illicit drugs. As so, through this research, a majority of arguments that look at general 
influence of PDMPs contend that effectiveness of these programs is not highly impactful.  
Specific Robust Characteristics of Select PDMPs  
 Because studies have generally shown the effectiveness of PDMPs to be unclear, many 
researchers have conducted deeper dives into understanding the association between certain 
characteristics of PDMPs and its specific impact on controlling opioid prescription rates. Because 
PDMPs are implemented on a state-by-state basis, many features are variable and are not constant 
across different states’ program, for example mandating prescribers to access the PDMP prior to 
prescribing, data updating frequency, the level of drug schedule monitored, among other factors 
(Manasco et al. 2016). Thus, researchers have begun to break down specific characteristics of 
PDMPs to understand which features increase effectiveness of these programs.  
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One significant feature is the impact of mandatory PDMPs, in which physicians and 
dispensers are required to view a patient’s prescription history from the PDMPs before prescribing. 
In the specific case of emergency physicians, researchers Suffoletto, Lynch, Pacella, Yealy, and 
Callaway (2018) established that opioid prescribing did decrease significantly, and its findings 
support mandating PDMP programs. Such “must access” PDMPs meaningfully reduce opioid 
misuse metrics in Medicare Part D when compared with PDMPs that do not implement this 
provision, a finding critical to a paper by Buchmueller and Carey (2018). In another conducted by 
researchers in the journal Drug and Alcohol Dependence, researchers Strickler et al. (2019) 
discussed how mandatory use laws for PDMPs increased prescriber registration and utilization of 
the program, which resulted in lower rates of opioid prescribing and overlapping opioid 
prescribing in two specific states.  
Other robust characteristics that have been studied are the frequency of data reporting, 
schedules of drugs monitored, inter-state data reporting, and access to PDMP information by law 
enforcement. Not surprisingly, those programs in states with higher frequency of data reporting 
tend to see a slower increase in prescription opioid-related poisoning rates in a nationally-
represented study of privately insured adults (Pauly, Slavova, Delcher, Freeman, and Talbert 
2018). Researcher Bryce Pardo (2017) concluded that states with generally stronger PDMPs have 
fewer prescription opioid overdose drug deaths than states with weaker PDMPs in the period 
between 1999 and 2014. Pardo defines strength as the presence and importance of certain 
characteristics, such as data reporting frequency, the amount of drug schedules monitored, access 
for law enforcement, inter-state data sharing, and the presence of an oversight board. The 
importance of high data reporting and greater drugs supervised is further advanced by this study, 
which discovered that while PDMPs had great variation, they were in general associated with 
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reductions in opioid-related death rates, especially if the PDMP had a higher number of robust 
characteristics, such as monitoring four or more drug schedules and updating data on a weekly or 
daily basis  (Patrick, Fry, Jones, and Buntin 2016). Pauly et al. (2018) also concluded that states 
that monitored more schedules experienced fewer increases in the risk of prescription opioid-
related poisoning over time. Lastly, operational PDMPs, defined as being accessible to both law 
enforcement and prescribers, was noted as another key characteristic that strongly correlates with 
decreasing prescriptions rates over time (Pauly et al. 2018).  
Proposed Research Goals  
In addition to the differences in characteristics of PDMPs, the implementation agency also 
varies on a state-by-state level. No studies have currently been conducted examining the effects of 
these administrative differences on opioid overdose death rates and opioid prescription rates. Each 
state is able to enact and authorize their PDMPs through the department they believe has the 
resources to properly oversee and handle this database. A variety of state agencies administers 
PDMPs, including state Pharmacy Boards, state Department of Health, Law Enforcement, 
Professional Licensing Agency, Substance Abuse Agency, and Consumer Protection Agency 
(Figure 3). Because each agency may have slightly different objectives, effectiveness of PDMPs 
may relate heavily with the administering agency.  
PROPOSED METHODS & ANALYSIS 
Research Question 
This paper will aim to analyze and discuss the effects of overall agency type and effects of 
the specific operating agency on opioid overdose death rates and opioid prescription rates. 
Different agency types that run such PDMP programs may have conflicting interests that may 
make them more or less strict when defining specific terms and characteristics of their PDMP. 
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Regression analysis will be based on similar methods outlined in a paper by Buchmueller and 
Carey (2018), which looked at the impact of PDMPs on rates of opioid misuse, and a paper by 
Wang (2019), which examined the influence of health information technology in reducing opioid 
related mortality.  
Research Data 
The independent variable will be the specific operating agency that runs the PDMP. The 
website Prescription Drug Monitoring Program Training and Technical Assistance Center 
contains detailed information about each states’ PDMP program; for each state, the websites list 
the specific agency responsible for monitoring the PDMP (ex. Alabama’s PDMP is run by the 
Alabama Department of Public Health).  
Dependent variables will be the opioid overdose death rates and opioid prescription rates. 
Age-adjusted opioid overdose death rates are archived on the Kaiser Family Foundation website, 
broken down by year and by state. In analyzing prescription opioid rates, the Center for Disease 
Control or CDC has available data for both rates of medically recorded opioid prescriptions on a 
yearly state-by-state basis.  
Empirical Strategy: Effect of Agency Type & Specific Operating Agency 
 The principal empirical analysis will be split into two parts. First, the overall impact of an 
agency type will be analysis by determining the differences on opioid prescription rate and opioid 
overdose deaths. Agency type will be defined by determining the main industry focus or goal of 
who that agency serves to benefit. The six different agencies that run PDMPs are state Pharmacy 
Boards, state Department of Health, Law Enforcement, Professional Licensing Agency, Substance 
Abuse Agency, and Consumer Protection Agency. Health-facing agency types will be defined as 
agency types that focus specifically on the medical and health implications of any policy. Out of 
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the six agencies, state Pharmacy Boards, state Department of Health, and Substance Abuse 
Agencies will be categorized as health-facing agency types. Consumer-facing agency types will 
be defined as agency types that exist to serve the interests of the end consumer through enacting 
policies that impact consumer safety and product usage. Three agency types, Law Enforcement, 
Professional Licensing Agency, and Consumer Protection Agency will be categorized as 
consumer-facing agency types. I hypothesize that consumer-facing agencies would likely have 
greater reduction in opioid overdose rates and opioid prescription rates given these agencies exist 
to purposely serve consumers and protect consumers’ well-being. These agencies have fewer ties 
to physicians and prescribers, and perhaps would be less likely to be influenced by advice and 
recommendations provided by medical clinicians. The first regression model will test the impact 
of state operating agency type on a yearly basis on opioid prescription rate and opioid overdose 
deaths. The regression model will be:  
yst = δs + δt + β2(mandate) + mandate*(healthagencies) + εst 
where y is an outcome variable aggregated over a state-year and mandate is an indicator variable 
that equals one if a state has mandated physician/prescriber enrollment or query and equals zero if 
a state does not have mandated physician/prescriber enrollment or query. The variable 
healthagencies will also be coded similarly as healthagencies will equal 0 and consumer-facing 
agencies will equal zero. Two different outcomes (yst) will be tested: age-adjusted opioid overdose 
death rates and opioid prescription rates. Each regression will contain fixed effects for states (δs) 
and years (δt) to account for any differences between states and years, respectively. In addition, 
standard errors will be clustered at the state-level (εst).  
 Second, the effect of each specific agency on PDMP effectiveness will be tested by 
determine the differences in the same two dependent variables opioid prescription rate and opioid 
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overdose deaths. Six different operating agencies will be tested: state Pharmacy Boards, state 
Department of Health, Law Enforcement, Professional Licensing Agency, Substance Abuse 
Agency, and Consumer Protection Agency. I hypothesize that agencies targeted with managing 
consumer behavior such as Law Enforcement and Consumer Protection Agencies will result in a 
more effective PDMP with lower opioid overdose rates and opioid prescription rates. The second 
regression model will be:  
yst = δs + δt + β2(mandate) + mandate*(deptofhealth) + mandate*(consumerprotection) + 
mandate*(professionallicensing) + mandate*(lawenforcement) + mandate*(substanceabuse) + 
εst 
where similarly, y is an outcome variable aggregated over a state-year and mandate is an indicator 
variable that equals one if a state has mandated physician/prescriber enrollment or query and equals 
zero if a state does not have mandated physician/prescriber enrollment or query. Likewise, the 
variable healthagencies will equal one and consumer-facing agencies will equal zero. Two 
different outcomes (yst) will be tested: age-adjusted opioid overdose death rates and opioid 
prescription rates in each of the six operating agency types. This regression will also contain fixed 
effects for states (δs) and years (δt) with standard errors clustered at the state-level (εst).  
 In both empirical analyses, only states with mandated PDMPs will be used in this study. 
Many research papers have proved that the statutory mandates that require prescribers to register 
with their respective state’s PDMP and use it are significantly more effective in opioid 
prescriptions and opioid-related deaths (Suffoletto et al. 2018; Buchmueller and Carey 2018; Wen, 
Schackman, Aden, and Bao 2017). Because this metric is fairly common one where over half of 
states have instituted this policy, analysis for this paper will look at the effect of operating agency 
in states with mandated PDMP programs.  
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Qualitative Analysis: General Perception of PDMPs  
A second part of the analysis will contain a qualitative portion that determines the general 
sentiment and behavior associated with Pennsylvania’s PDMP. More specifically, this section will 
aim to address how Pennsylvania’s PDMP, which is by the PA Department of Health, impacts 
effectiveness in lowering opioid prescription rates and opioid overdose rates by concentrating on 
physician and prescriber behavior patterns and overall usage. Perceptions of a PDMP could 
affected by how intensely and carefully users view and utilize information provided by PDMPs. 
These insights can be analyzed through a structured survey of physicians that contain qualitative 
data that question about the usage of PDMPs, such as how often physicians check PDMPs before 
prescribing, and if physicians ever change prescription schedules due to uncovered PDMP data 
(Hildebran et al. 2014; Leichtling et al. 2016). Physicians who have shown to find PDMP 
utilization the most valuable, including emergency medicine physicians, pain management, and 
primary care physicians, will be the participants in this survey (Irvine et al. 2014). The goals of  
this analysis aim to determine how the presence of PDMP operated by a certain agency 
qualitatively impact clinical use and analyze potential patterns of PDMP use by physicians.  
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Effect of Operating Agency on Opioid Prescription Rates 
Operating agency type for each state can be found on Table 1 in addition to information 
regarding the presence of a mandate. Having a mandate is defined as a PDMP mandating 
physician/prescriber enrollment or query, information provided by the Prescription Drug 
Monitoring Program Training and Technical Assistance Center. Table 2 and Table 3 report the 
results of the time series regression analysis using retail opioid prescription rates dispensed per 
100 individuals as the dependent variable. Years 2006 to 2016 for all 49 states including 
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Washington D.C. are included in the time series, which were provided in the CDC data set. 
Missouri is eliminated as it is the only state that has not implemented a PDMP at the time of study. 
The effect of the mandate was accounted for as an indicator variable as shown in both Tables 2 
and 3.  
Table 2 looks at the significance of and compares retail opioid prescription rates health-
facing agencies against consumer-facing agencies. All of the point estimates, including the year 
measurements, presence of a health-facing agency, and presence of a health-facing agency 
combined with a mandate, show statistical significance. The presence of a mandate, which has 
been previously identified as an importance factor in PDMP effectiveness, is statistically 
significant in this analysis as well and corroborates similar studies on mandates. The presence of 
just a health agency alone reduces opioid prescription rates by approximately 15 prescriptions per 
100 individuals, resulting in a statistically significant at the 5% level. Examining the combined 
impact of a mandate with a PDMP that is implemented and operated by a health-facing agency 
further reduces the rate of opioid prescriptions by almost 26 prescriptions per 100 individuals 
compared with consumer-facing operating agencies. The presence of a health-facing agency such 
as the Department of Health, State Pharmacy Board, and Substance Abuse Agency, operating the 
PDMP displays statistical significance at the 1% level, showing statistically significant to a high 
degree. Hence, this data reflects the overall benefit of having a health-facing agency operate and 
implement a PDMP compared to a consumer-facing agency.  
A second analysis using opioid prescription rates was conducted on the individual impact 
of the four most common operating agencies, Department of Health, Pharmacy Boards, Law 
Enforcement, Professional Licensing. The results are reported in Table 3. Similar to the previous 
analysis, 49 states and Washington D.C. were included for years 2006 to 2016. Given there were 
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only three states—Maine, Maryland, and North Carolina—with a PDMP run by a Substance Abuse 
Agency, and only one state—Connecticut—with a PDMP operated by a Consumer Protection 
Agency, both Substance Abuse Agency and Consumer Protection Agency coefficients should be 
interpreted with caution. Due to collinearity, the interaction between mandate and Consumer 
Protection Agency and mandate Substance Abuse Agency were not available. Compared to a state 
Pharmacy Board, the presence of the Department of Health and Professional Licensing Agency 
alone, respectively, both show a decrease in retail opioid prescription rates. However, both these 
points estimates are not statistically significant at the 5% level. The individual impact of a Law 
Enforcement department operating and implementing a PDMP resulted in an opposite intended 
effect, in which opioid prescription rates increased by 26 prescriptions per 100 individuals, 
reaching statistically significance at the 1% level. This outcome may be affected by a relatively 
smaller sample of four states with Law Enforcement, which may create limitations in identifying 
the actual impact. Once combined with the effects of a mandate present in the PDMP, both 
Department of Health and Professional Licensing experienced decreased retail prescribing rates 
by one and 16 prescriptions per 100 individuals, respectively, although both did not reach 
statistically significance. The only operating agency, when combined with a mandate, that shows 
significance is Law Enforcement, likely for similar reasons as stated previously. The data shows 
that once effectiveness of PDMPs are broken down into each specific operating agency type, 
operating agency type likely does not matter given only one operating agency reached statistical 
significance. 
Effect of Operating Agency on Opioid Overdose Death Rates 
In addition to analyzing the effects on opioid prescription rates, another consideration is 
the impact of operating agency type on opioid overdose death rates per 100,000 population, as 
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provided by the Kaiser Family Foundation. The presence of a DPMP program not only encourages 
prescribers to be more aware of the frequency and dosage of opioid medications, but also further 
impacts usage and drives down adverse death rates from opioid overdose. Years 1999 to 2017 for 
49 states, excluding Missouri, and Washington D.C. are included in this model. 
Table 4 looks at the significance of and compares opioid overdose death rates for health-
facing agencies against consumer-facing agencies. The first analysis from Table 4 examines the 
impact of a state health-facing agency implementing and operating the PDMP. Both the presence 
of a mandate and the presence of a health-facing agency running and operating the PDMP lead to 
decreases in opioid overdose death rates of two deaths and four deaths per 100,000 population, 
respectively. The health-facing agency impact also show statistical significance, with a reaching 
statistically significance at 1%. After accounting for the effects of the mandate, the combined 
impact of the mandate in addition to the presence of a health-facing agency shows an even larger 
drop of six deaths per 100,000 population in opioid overdose death rates. With statistical 
significance of 5%, such results show very high statistical significance for the effectiveness of 
PDMPs implemented and operated by health-facing agencies.  
The second analysis that utilized opioid overdose death rates looked at the individual 
impact of the four most common operating agencies, Department of Health, Pharmacy Boards, 
Law Enforcement, and Professional Licensing. Substance Abuse Agency and Consumer 
Protection Agency are again excluded due to the low number of states. Results are shown in Table 
5, and again, 49 states excluding Missouri, and Washington D.C. are included in this analysis. 
Similar to the previous regression, the interaction between mandate and Consumer Protection 
Agency and mandate Substance Abuse Agency were not available due to collinearity reasons. 
Excluding the impact of the mandate and examining the isolated impact of each operating agency 
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types reflect findings opposite of previous models. This set of outcomes reflects a shift in overall 
PDMP effectiveness as opioid overdose death rates increase for PDMPs run by the Department of 
Health, Law Enforcement, and Professional Licensing agencies by five deaths, six deaths, and 4 
deaths, respectively, when compared to Pharmacy Boards. In addition, both Department of Health 
and Law Enforcement reaches statistically significance of 1%. However, due to the small number 
of states with Law Enforcement as their operating agency, this data may reveal a trend over a 
correlation. When the impact of the mandate is considered in this analysis, the model shows 
decreases in opioid overdose death rates for Department of Health, Law Enforcement, and 
Professional Licensing Agency of eight, 12, and seven deaths per 100,000 individuals when 
compared to Pharmacy Boards. In addition, all three operating agencies, when combined with the 
effect of the mandate, display statistical significance of 5%. Such results may signal that it may 
not be the operating agency responsible for the decreases in opioid overdose death rate, but the 
overall presence of a mandate. 
Regression Analysis: Model Assumptions and Limitations 
 This analysis rests upon a variety of assumptions made in the model. While year fixed 
effects are included in the regression, state fixed effects could not be included due to effects of 
collinearity as operating agency type does not vary within a state. Therefore, the exact degree of 
coefficients calculated in opioid prescription rates and opioid overdose death rates does not 
account for state by state variations, which is a limitation in robustness of this analysis. However, 
data does seemingly argue that the presence of health-facing agency effectively reduces opioid 
prescription rates by 25.9 prescriptions per 100 prescriptions and opioid overdose death rates by 
six deaths per 100,000 individuals, both coefficients of which are statistically significant at the 1% 
level.  
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 A second important assumption that rests on the interpretation of these results is the limited 
impact of other opioid-related policies that may have biased the effectiveness of a specific 
operating agency type. While the presence of the mandate has been repeatedly shown as a key 
characteristic in measuring effectiveness of a PDMP due to numerous studies stating its efficacy, 
other potentially influential characteristics were not included. Most of these characteristics were 
eliminated from the model due to high degrees of similarity across states; for example, 40 out of 
49 states plus Washington D.C. had PDMPs that covered drugs in Schedules II through IV while 
nine out of 49 states had PDMPs that covered drugs in Schedules II through V.  Schedule V drugs 
are generally used for antidiarrheal, antitussive, and analgesic purposes and do not include opioid 
medications such as hydrocodone and acetaminophen, which fall in Schedule II. As all states 
included Schedule II drugs, the class in which opioid medications fall, the impact of drug schedules 
was excluded from the regression model. In addition, another key assumption that was omitted 
due to the high degrees of similarity across all states is the impact of data collection frequency. All 
states except four states—California, Hawaii, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania—collect updated data 
for the PDMP daily or during the next business day. California and Hawaii both collect data every 
seven day, Oklahoma collects data at point of sale, and Pennsylvania collects data every two to 
three business days. EHR integration and interstate data sharing were two other variables ignored 
as the majority of states had not completed EHR integration or interstate data sharing.  
Physician Perception of PA’s PDMP and Usage Patterns  
 A second part of this study looks at the how the implementation and operation of 
Pennsylvania’s PDMP, which is run by the Pennsylvania Department of Health, affected 
physicians’ prescribing behavior. Emergency medicine, pain management, and primary care 
physicians at the University of Pennsylvania Health System are targeted given the frequency 
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PDMP usage. The participants are asked if they are aware of the operating agency that runs PA’s 
PDMP, how often they refer and check the PDMP before prescribing any controlled medications, 
if they have ever changed a patient’s prescription plan after viewing the PDMP, and how 
knowledgeable they perceive they are about the functionalities of the PDMP. The survey questions 
were developed by the author and were run online via Qualtrics survey form. Table 6 details the 
questions asked in the survey. After reaching out to 256 physicians via email messaging, 94 
physicians responded to the survey.  
Survey responses are reported in Table 7, which breaks down the responses to each 
question and answer choice. In the survey of 94 participants, 100% of physician participants knew 
what a PDMP was, and 46 (48.9%) physicians stated that they knew the operating agency that 
operates PA’s PDMP, which was the Department of Health. Among the 46 physicians who first 
stated they knew the operating agency, 89.13% correctly selected the Department of Health. 
Among the 48 physicians who initially did not know what the operating agency was, a large 
majority, 72.92%, guessed and selected the correct agency type out of a multiple-choice question 
that provided the following six options: Department of Health, Pharmacy Board, Substance Abuse 
Agency, Law Enforcement, Professional Licensing Agency, and Consumer Protection Agency. 
Those who did not select the correct agency type most commonly guessed Substance Abuse 
Agency, Pharmacy Board, and Professional Licensing Agency. A graphic of such results is 
depicted in Figure 3.  
The survey also aimed to uncover physician prescribing patterns given their knowledge 
about PA’s PDMP, which is shown in Table 8. 62 or 65.96% of the physician respondents stated 
they “always” check the PDMP prior to prescribing any controlled medications including opioids 
medications, while another 22 physicians or 23.40% only check the PDMP “most of the time”. 
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Figure 4 details this breakdown.  Of all the participants, 71 physicians or 75.53%, have adjusted a 
patient’s prescription plan or have made a mental health/substance abuse referral due to data 
provided in a PDMP. Lastly, on a sliding scale with 1 being not knowledgeable at all and 10 being 
very knowledge, the 14 physicians rated themselves a 10 of their knowledge of the functionalities 
of the PDMP. The lowest score was a 2, and the average score of 8.085. Overall, the majority of 
physician participants of the survey effectively utilize the PDMP’s functionalities in considering 
an opioid medication prescription plan.   
Survey Limitations 
 Analysis from the survey data rests upon a number of key limitations. Due to the impacts 
of COVID-19, in-depth personal interviews could not be conducted so surveys were substituted 
instead. Survey response rate was therefore suboptimal, given the lower than expected response 
rate of 36.7%. Surveys were sent out to all physicians listed on the University of Pennsylvania 
Health System’s emergency medicine, pain management, and primary care team via email. While 
participation was encouraged, many physicians may have been surrounded with other urgent 
matters. Low response rates from physicians introduces potential bias as those responders may 
have systematically different characteristics from non-responding physicians. Moreover, this 
survey specifically targets University of Pennsylvania Health System physicians, which may 
provide another layer of bias given the University of Pennsylvania has spent much effort training 
their faculty on PDMP usage. As so, this data may not be generalizable to physicians in other 
hospital systems or states. Lastly, social desirability could provide biased results although all 
survey respondents remained anonymous and all answers remained confidential.  
DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS 
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 Several key conclusions emerge from this analysis. First, the results from the quantitative 
portion of the study suggest that in general, health-facing operating agencies seem to perform more 
effectively than consumer-facing agencies. Combined with the presence of a mandate, the effect 
of a health-facing agency was even more amplified. This holds true for both opioid prescribing 
rates, which are directly affected by PDMP usage, and opioid overdose death rates, which are 
connected by the decrease in accessibility of opioids available for medical use; both of which 
showed highly statistically significant effects. Decreasing the dosages of opioid prescriptions or 
adjusting prescription frequency contributes to a reduced likelihood of opioid addiction, which is 
highly correlated with length of use and prescription dosage levels. To best understand and limit 
the repercussions related to opioid additions, health-facing operating agencies such as a state’s 
Department of Health or Pharmacy Board may in fact have the most applicable knowledge to 
create policies and programs to help control opioid dispensing. These operating agencies likely are 
already very familiar with prescribing patterns and physician behavior, especially compared with 
consumer-facing operating agencies which may not have such necessary insight. Consumer-facing 
agencies, which include Law Enforcement or Professional Licensing mainly function and manage 
activities outside of the scope of medical prescription activity and opioid use, and therefore these 
agencies are likely less successful with creating an effective PDMP targeted at changing physician 
prescribing behavior.  
 Although these results indicate that effectiveness of a PMDP can be affected by the 
presence of a health-facing operating agency, this study shows that there is limited impact when 
considering the effect of each individual operating agency type. Combined with the presence of a 
mandate, each operating agency type decreased the opioid prescription rate, although most of the 
coefficients were not statistically significant. Combined with the presence of a mandate, each 
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operating agency type also lead to reductions in opioid overdose death rates, with most coefficients 
showing statistical significance in this case. A possible explanation could be the state effects that 
were left out due to collinearity concerns. Another consideration could be the effect of a relatively 
smaller sample size when considering the impact of each individual operating agency compared 
to the combined impact of all health-facing and consumer-facing operating agency type. While a 
significant portion of states had PDMPs run by the Department of Health or Pharmacy Board, 
fewer states had PDMPs run by the Professional Licensing Agency or Law Enforcement, and such  
smaller data samples likely impacted statistical significance of the results.  
 The results from the qualitative survey portion of the study suggest that a portion of 
emergency medicine, pain management, and primary care physicians are not only aware of the 
functionalities of a PDMP, but also have general knowledge about the operational factors as well. 
Almost half of the physicians knew that Pennsylvania’s PDMP was operated and implemented by 
the PA Department of Health, and out of those who did not initially know, a majority correctly 
guessed the right operating agency. Hence, such results portray the overall knowledge and 
familiarity that physicians may have, especially among the three physician specialty types that 
most commonly utilize PDMPs. From the survey responses, the majority of physicians have 
actively changed a patient’s prescription plan after referring to patient data from the PDMP, 
indicating the effectiveness of Pennsylvania’s PDMP, operated by the PA Department of Health, 
in limiting medical opioid accessibility. By reducing medical opioid prescriptions or encouraging 
patients to seek mental health or substance abuse treatment, opioid overdose death rates are likely 
negatively affected as well. As the Department of Health falls into the facing-agency operating 
agency category, these results align with the previous quantitative finding that health-facing 
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agencies show greater effectiveness in reducing opioid prescription rates and decreasing opioid 
overdose death rates than consumer-facing facing agencies.  
 Health-facing agencies, which contribute to more effective control of medically dispensed 
opioid use, are likely to have greater impact due to analogous knowledge of physicians prescribing 
patterns. Being able to identify processes, such as mandates, that persuade physicians to more 
proactively consider an opioid prescription plan is critical in controlling the opioid epidemic. Most 
of states’ Department of Health or Pharmacy Board is headed by directors with medical degrees 
and practicing experience, which often offer first-hand knowledge of physician behavior. 
Pennsylvania’s Department of Health is run by Dr. Rachel Levine, a Fellow of the Society of 
Adolescent Health and Medicine and accomplished author on the opioid crisis, medical marijuana, 
and adolescent medicine (Department of Health Executive Leadership 2020). As so, a 
recommendation to further increase effectiveness of PDMP would be for states should consider 
allowing a health-facing agency to partner in operating and implementing a PDMP. Consumer-
facing agencies such as Law Enforcement or Professional Licensing Agencies likely lack the 
medical knowledge and general expertise necessary to design procedures and policies that target 
specific physician prescribing behavior. As a result, these states hence experience an overall less 
effective PDMP. Missouri, the singular state that has not yet passed legislation to institute a PDMP, 
would likely benefit most from the MO Department of Health or MO Pharmacy Board 
implementing and operating its PDMP. 
FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS 
 Future research should focus on further building upon understanding the impact of 
operational characteristics, which has not yet been studied. Some operational characteristics that 
differ across states’ PDMPs include sources of funding, which vary from state funds, federal 
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grants, and local funds. Employee headcount is another factor that differs across different PDMPs, 
including the number of operational employees, technical workers, and epidemiological analysts. 
Lastly, given the connection between containing illegal opioids and Law Enforcement, another 
operational characteristic should consider the various requirements of Law Enforcement to view 
and access PDMP data in curbing physician over-prescribing. Law Enforcement in different 
PDMPs may need a subpoena, court order, probable cause, search warrant, proper need, or other 
requirements to access a PDMP, all with varying degrees of accessibility which may impact 
physician prescribing behaviors.  
 Given the benefits of PDMPs, which include reduced opioid access through limiting 
prescription and decreased opioid overdose rates, more attention is needed to maximize their 
clinical utility to reach their full potential. Because PDMPs are state-run programs, it is essential 
to determine and understand the impacts of both operational and functional characteristics to best 
reduce opioid usage and increase patient safety.  
  
  27 
Works Cited 
Alderks, C. E. 2017. Trends in the use of Methadone, Buprenorphine, and Extended-Release 
Naltrexone at Substance Abuse Treatment Facilities: 2003-2015. National Survey of 
Substance Abuse Treatment Services.  
Alpert, A., W. Evans, E. M.J. Lieber, and D. Powell. 2019. Origins of the Opioid Crisis and Its 
Enduring Impacts. National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Alpert, A., D. Powell, and R. Liccardo Pacula. 2017. Supply-Side Drug Policy in the Presence of 
Substitutes: Evidence from the Introduction of Abuse-Deterrent Opioids. American 
Economic Journal 10 (4): 1-35.  
Baker, D. W. 2017. History of The Joint Commission’s Pain Standards. Jama 317 (11): 1117.  
Bonnie, R. J., M. A. Ford, and J. Phillips. 2017. Pain Management and the Opioid Epidemic: 
Balancing Societal and Individual Benefits and Risks of Prescription Opioid Use. 
Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.  
Buchmueller, T., and C. Carey. 2018. The Effect of Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs on 
Opioid Utilization in Medicare. American Economic Journal: Public Policy 10 (1): 77–
112.  
Calvert, S., and A. Campo-Flores. 2016. States Fight Opioid Epidemic With Prescription 
Databases. The Wall Street Journal. (September 2).  
CDC Wonder. 2017. National Overdose Deaths Involving Prescription Opioids—Number 
Among All Ages, 1999-2017.  
Center for Medicare & Medicaid Service. 2016. The Role of a Prescription Drug Monitoring 
Program in Reducing Prescription Drug Diversion, Misuse, and Abuse.  
  28 
Clark, D. J., and M. A. Schumacher. 2017. America’s Opioid Epidemic: Supply and Demand 
Considerations. Anesthesia & Analgesia 125 (5): 1667–74.  
Department of Health Executive Leadership. 2020. Pennsylvania Department of Health. 
Available at: https://www.health.pa.gov/About/Pages/Leadership.aspx.  
Elder, J., G. Depalma, and J. Pines. 2018. Optimal Implementation of Prescription Drug 
Monitoring Programs in the Emergency Department. Western Journal of Emergency 
Medicine 19 (2): 387–91.  
Fink, D. S., J. P. Schleimer, A. Sarvet, K. K. Grover, C. Delcher, A. Castillo-Carniglia, J. H. 
Kim, A. Rivera-Aguirre, S. G. Henry, S. S. Martins, et al. 2018. Association Between 
Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs and Nonfatal and Fatal Drug Overdoses. Annals 
of Internal Medicine 168 (11): 783–90.  
Finklea, K., L. N. Sacco, E. Bagalman. 2014. Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs. 
Congressional Research Service. Washington, D.C. 
Finley, E. P., A. Garcia, K. Rosen, D. Mcgeary, M. J. Pugh, and J. S. Potter. 2017. Evaluating 
the Impact of Prescription Drug Monitoring Program Implementation: A Scoping 
Review. BMC Health Services Research 17 (1): 420.  
Florence, C. S., C. Zhou, F. Luo, and L. Xu. 2016. The Economic Burden of Prescription Opioid 
Overdose, Abuse, and Dependence in the United States, 2013. Medical Care 54 (10): 
901–6.  
Gross, J., and D. B. Gordon. 2019. The Strengths and Weaknesses of Current US Policy to 
Address Pain. American Journal of Public Health 109 (1): 66–72.  
Haffajee, R. L., A. B. Jena, and S. G. Weiner. 2015. Mandatory Use of Prescription Drug 
Monitoring Programs. JAMA 313 (9): 891-892.  
  29 
Haffajee, R. L., and R. G. Frank. 2018. Making the Opioid Public Health Emergency 
Effective. JAMA Psychiatry 75 (8): 767–68.  
Hildebran, C., D. J. Cohen, J. M. Irvine, C. Foley, N. Okane, T. Beran, and R. A. Deyo. 2014. 
How Clinicians Use Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs: A Qualitative Inquiry. Pain 
Medicine 15 (7): 1179–86.  
Irvine, J. M., S. E. Hallvik, C. Hildebran, M. Marino, T. Beran, and R. A. Deyo. 2014. Who Uses 
a Prescription Drug Monitoring Program and How? Insights From a Statewide Survey of 
Oregon Clinicians. The Journal of Pain 15 (7): 747–55. 
Islam, M M., and I. S. Mcrae. 2014. An Inevitable Wave of Prescription Drug Monitoring 
Programs in the Context of Prescription Opioids: Pros, Cons and Tensions. BMC 
Pharmacology and Toxicology 15 (1): 15-46.  
Jones, M. R., O. Viswanath, J. Peck, A. D. Kaye, J. S. Gill, and T. T. Simopoulos. 2018. A Brief 
History of the Opioid Epidemic and Strategies for Pain Medicine. Pain and Therapy 7 
(1): 13–21.  
Leichtling, G. J., J. M. Irvine, C. Hildebran, D. J. Cohen, S. E. Hallvik, and R. A. Deyo. 2016. 
Clinicians’ Use of Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs in Clinical Practice and 
Decision-Making: Table 1. Pain Medicine 18 (6): 1063–1069.  
Lynn, R. R., and J. Galinkin. 2017. Naloxone Dosage for Opioid Reversal: Current Evidence and 
Clinical Implications. Therapeutic Advances in Drug Safety 9 (1): 63–88.  
Manasco, A. T., C. Griggs, R. Leeds, B. K. Langlois, A. H. Breaud, P. M. Mitchell, and S. G. 
Weiner. 2016. Characteristics of State Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs: A State-
by-State Survey. Pharmacoepidemiology and Drug Safety 25 (7): 847–51.  
  30 
Mishra, M. 2019. U.S. Government Gives States Nearly $2 Billion to Combat Opioid Crisis. 
Reuters. Thomson Reuters. (September 4).  
Morone, N. E., and D. K. Weiner. 2013. Pain as the Fifth Vital Sign: Exposing the Vital Need for 
Pain Education. Clinical Therapeutics 35 (11): 1728–32.  
Muldoon, M. 2019. Getting on Your Nerves (Literally): How Opioids Work - Addiction Center. 
AddictionCenter. (May 22).  
Nam, Y. H., D. G. Shea, and Y. Shi. 2017. State Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs and 
Fatal Drug Overdoses. The American Journal of Managed Care 23 (5): 297–303. 
National Institute of Drug Abuse (NIDA). 2019. Opioid Overdose Crisis. (January) 
Pardo, Bryce. 2017. Do More Robust Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs Reduce 
Prescription Opioid Overdose? Addiction 112 (10): 1773–83.  
Patrick, S. W., C. E. Fry, T. F. Jones, and M. B. Buntin. 2016. Implementation Of Prescription 
Drug Monitoring Programs Associated With Reductions In Opioid-Related Death Rates. 
Health Affairs 35 (7): 1324–32. 
Patrick, S. W., C. E. Fry, T. F. Jones, and M. B. Buntin. 2016. Implementation Of Prescription 
Drug Monitoring Programs Associated With Reductions In Opioid-Related Death 
Rates. Health Affairs 35 (7): 1324–32.  
Paulozzi, L. J., E. M. Kilbourne, and H. A. Desai. 2011. Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs 
and Death Rates from Drug Overdose. Oxford Academic Pain Medicine 12 (5): 747–54.  
Pauly, N. J., S. Slavova, C. Delcher, P. R. Freeman, and J. Talbert. 2018. Features of Prescription 
Drug Monitoring Programs Associated with Reduced Rates of Prescription Opioid-
Related Poisonings.” Drug and Alcohol Dependence 184 (1): 26–32.  
  31 
Rosenblum, A., L. A. Marsch, H. Joseph, and R. K. Portenoy. 2008. Opioids and the Treatment 
of Chronic Pain: Controversies, Current Status, and Future Directions. Experimental and 
Clinical Psychopharmacology 16 (5): 405–16.  
Strickler, G. K., K. Zhang, J. F. Halpin, A. S.b. Bohnert, G. T. Baldwin, and P. W. Kreiner. 
2019. Effects of Mandatory Prescription Drug Monitoring Program (PDMP) Use Laws 
on Prescriber Registration and Use and on Risky Prescribing. Drug and Alcohol 
Dependence 19 (4): 430–438.  
Suffoletto, B., M. Lynch, C. B. Pacella, D. M. Yealy, and C. W. Callaway. 2018. The Effect of a 
Statewide Mandatory Prescription Drug Monitoring Program on Opioid Prescribing by 
Emergency Medicine Providers Across 15 Hospitals in a Single Health System. The 
Journal of Pain 19 (4): 430–38.  
Van Zee A.  2009. The Promotion and Marketing of OxyContin: Commercial Triumph, Public 
Health Tragedy. American Journal of Public Health 99 (2): 221–27.  
Wang, L. X. 2018. The Complementarity of Health Information and Health IT for Reducing 
Opioid-Related Mortality and Morbidity. SSRN Electronic Journal.  
Weber, L. 2018. Why Missouri's The Last Holdout On A Statewide Rx Monitoring Program. 
Kaiser Health New (May 23).  
Wen, H. B. R. Schackman, B. Aden, and Y. Bao. 2017. States With Prescription Drug 
Monitoring Mandates Saw A Reduction In Opioids Prescribed To Medicaid Enrollees. 
Health Affairs 36 (4): 733–41.  
 
  
  32 
Supplemental Figures & Graphics 
 
 











1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
National Drug Overdose Deaths Involving Prescription Opioids, 
Number Among All Ages
Prescription Opioids
Prescription Opioids Without Other Synthetic Narcotics
Prescription Opioids and Other Synthetic Narcotics






Figure 2: Graphic of PDMP structure and different parties involved. Healthcare providers and 
prescribers/pharmacies can both input patient information into the PDMP and view patient 
prescribing history. Such information is commonly shared with state insurance programs, 
healthcare licensure boards, state and federal health departments, and law enforcement.  
  






Figure 3: Graphic of the operating agency that runs the PDMP in each state and D.C.  
Note: Missouri does not have PDMP and therefore is not shaded in the map.   
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Table 1: State Prescription Drug Monitoring Program and correlated operating agency type. 
 
 State Name Abbreviation Operating Agency Mandate  
 Alabama AL Department of Health Mandate 
 Alaska AK Pharmacy Boards Mandate 
 Arizona AZ Pharmacy Boards Mandate 
 Arkansas AR Department of Health Mandate 
 California CA Law Enforcement  Mandate 
 Colorado CO Pharmacy Boards Mandate 
 Connecticut CT Consumer Protection Agency Mandate 
 Delaware DW Professional Licensing Agency Mandate 
 District of Columbia DC Department of Health No mandate 
 Florida FL Department of Health Mandate 
 Georgia GA Department of Health Mandate 
 Hawaii HI Law Enforcement  Mandate 
 Idaho ID Pharmacy Boards No mandate 
 Illinois IL Department of Health Mandate 
 Indiana IN Professional Licensing Agency Mandate 
 Iowa IA Pharmacy Boards Mandate 
 Kansas KS Pharmacy Boards No mandate 
 Kentucky KY Department of Health Mandate 
 Louisiana LA Pharmacy Boards Mandate 
 Maine ME Substance Abuse Agency Mandate 
 Maryland MD Substance Abuse Agency Mandate 
 Massachusetts MA Department of Health Mandate 
 Michigan MI Professional Licensing Agency Mandate 
 Minnesota MN Pharmacy Boards Mandate 
 Mississippi MS Pharmacy Boards Mandate 
 Missouri MO   
 Montana MT Pharmacy Boards No mandate 
 Nebraska NE Department of Health No mandate 
 Nevada NV Pharmacy Boards Mandate 
 New Hampshire NH Pharmacy Boards Mandate 
 New Jersey NJ Law Enforcement  Mandate 
 New Mexico NM Pharmacy Boards Mandate 
 New York NY Department of Health Mandate 
 North Carolina NC Substance Abuse Agency Mandate 
 North Dakota ND Pharmacy Boards Mandate 
 Ohio OH Pharmacy Boards Mandate 
 Oklahoma OK Law Enforcement  No mandate 
 Oregon OR Department of Health Mandate 
 Pennsylvania PA Department of Health Mandate 
 Rhode Island RI Department of Health Mandate 
 South Carolina SC Department of Health No mandate 
 South Dakota SD Pharmacy Boards Mandate 
 Tennessee TN Pharmacy Boards Mandate 
 Texas TX Pharmacy Boards Mandate 
 Utah UT Professional Licensing Agency Mandate 
 Vermont VT Department of Health Mandate 
 Virginia VA Professional Licensing Agency Mandate 
 Washington WA Department of Health Mandate 
 West Virginia WV Pharmacy Boards Mandate 
 Wisconsin WI Professional Licensing Agency No mandate 
 Wyoming WY Pharmacy Boards No mandate 
Note: Data was sourced from Prescription Drug Monitoring Program Training and Technical Assistance Center  
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Table 2: Regression output for impact of health-facing agency vs. consumer-facing agency for 




Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) 78.521 6.256 12.551 < 2e-16 *** 
year2016 9.384 4.530 2.071 0.038867 * 
year2015 14.167 4.554 3.111 0.001978 ** 
year2014 19.208 4.554 4.218 2.96E-05 *** 
year2013 21.706 4.577 4.742 2.82E-06 *** 
year2012 25.116 4.683 5.363 1.29E-07 *** 
year2011 24.097 4.742 5.081 5.44E-07 *** 
year2010 26.434 5.038 5.246 2.36E-07 *** 
year2009 25.534 5.083 5.023 7.26E-07 *** 
year2008 26.437 5.181 5.103 4.88E-07 *** 
year2007 23.274 5.414 4.299 2.09E-05 *** 
year2006 21.225 5.630 3.770 0.000184 *** 
mandate -25.721 5.970 -4.308 2.01E-05 *** 
health agency -15.229 6.278 -2.426 0.015647 * 
mandate*health agency -25.902 6.815 -3.801 0.000163 *** 
Note: This table reports results using the regression equation found on page 13 using opioid prescription rates 
reported by the CDC as the variable of measurement. Fixed effects for years are always included. Robust p-values 
are as follows: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
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Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) 64.840 4.485 14.456 < 2e-16 *** 
year2016 9.384 4.236 2.215 0.027216 *  
year2015 14.130 4.258 3.318 0.000978 *** 
year2014 19.171 4.258 4.502 8.54E-06 *** 
year2013 21.720 4.281 5.074 5.66E-07 *** 
year2012 24.384 4.383 5.563 4.52E-08 *** 
year2011 23.709 4.438 5.342 1.45E-07 *** 
year2010 25.299 4.717 5.363 1.30E-07 *** 
year2009 24.440 4.758 5.136 4.15E-07 *** 
year2008 25.290 4.850 5.214 2.80E-07 *** 
year2007 21.807 5.076 4.297 2.12E-05 *** 
year2006 19.783 5.280 3.747 0.000202 *** 
mandate 1.138 3.865 0.294 0.768560  
consumerprotection -20.391 6.911 -2.951 0.003333 ** 
deptofhealth -3.372 5.990 -0.563 0.573774  
lawenforcement 26.334 7.043 3.739 0.000208 *** 
professionallicensing -15.181 10.131 -1.498 0.134696  
substanceabuse -2.537 4.339 -0.585 0.559007  
mandate*consumerprotection -- -- -- --  
mandate*deptofhealth -1.234 6.505 -0.174 0.861716  
mandate*lawenforcement -40.592 4.597 -3.500 0.024714 * 
mandate*professionallicensing -15.341 10.671 -1.531 0.126366  
mandate*substanceabuse -- -- -- --  
Note: This table reports results using the regression equation found on page 13 using opioid prescription rates 
reported by the CDC as the variable of measurement. Fixed effects for years are always included. Robust p-values 
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Table 4: Regression output for impact of health-facing agency vs. consumer-facing agency for 




Std.  Error t-value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) 4.545 1.827 2.488 0.013187 * 
year2017 14.779 1.696 8.716 < 2e-16 *** 
year2016 12.942 1.696 7.633 1.18E-13 *** 
year2015 9.599 1.701 5.642 2.82E-08 *** 
year2014 7.954 1.701 4.675 3.79E-06 *** 
year2013 6.279 1.707 3.678 0.000261 *** 
year2012 5.754 1.736 3.315 0.000982 *** 
year2011 5.549 1.744 3.182 0.001553 ** 
year2010 4.857 1.791 2.712 0.006918 ** 
year2009 4.485 1.802 2.489 0.013143 * 
year2008 4.725 1.802 2.622 0.009021 ** 
year2007 4.498 1.856 2.423 0.015733 * 
year2006 4.232 1.8891 2.24 0.025525 * 
year2005 3.599 1.9505 1.845 0.065647  
year2004 2.900 1.9751 1.468 0.142699  
year2003 2.719 2.0023 1.358 0.175143  
year2002 1.813 2.0323 0.892 0.372905  
year2001 1.181 2.0323 0.581 0.561342  
year2000 0.306 2.032 0.151 0.880280  
mandate -2.464 1.276 -1.931 0.054046  
health agency -4.413 1.501 -2.939 0.003446 ** 
mandate*health agency -6.456 1.613 -4.003 7.21E-05 *** 
Note: This table reports results using the regression equation found on page 14 using opioid overdose deaths 
reported by the Kaiser Family Foundation as the variable of measurement. Fixed effects for years are always 
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Std.  Error t-value Pr(>|t|)  
(Intercept) -0.977 1.740 -0.562 0.574664  
year2017 14.150 1.642 8.615 < 2e-16  *** 
year2016 12.314 1.642 7.497 3.07E-13 *** 
year2015 9.056 1.647 5.499 6.14E-08 *** 
year2014 7.411 1.647 4.501 8.47E-06 *** 
year2013 5.769 1.653 3.491 0.000525 *** 
year2012 5.159 1.678 3.075 0.002223 ** 
year2011 4.982 1.686 2.955 0.003278 ** 
year2010 3.985 1.734 2.298 0.022000 * 
year2009 3.646 1.745 2.090 0.037142 * 
year2008 3.885 1.745 2.227 0.026397 * 
year2007 3.999 1.793 2.230 0.026192 * 
year2006 3.863 1.823 2.119 0.034581 * 
year2005 3.314 1.882 1.761 0.078927  
year2004 2.700 1.906 1.416 0.157264  
year2003 2.629 1.931 1.361 0.174083  
year2002 1.813 1.960 0.925 0.355534  
year2001 1.181 1.960 0.603 0.546985  
year2000 0.306 1.960 0.156 0.875895  
mandate 6.909 1.189 5.813 1.11E-08 *** 
consumerprotection -0.008 1.821 -0.004 0.996517  
deptofhealth 5.167 1.946 2.655 0.008183 **  
lawenforcement 6.400 1.675 3.820 0.000150 ***  
professionallicensing 4.357 2.725 1.599 0.110537  
substanceabuse 0.261 1.121 0.233 0.815628  
mandate*consumerprotection -- -- -- --  
mandate*deptofhealth -7.897 2.058 -3.837 0.000141 ***  
mandate*lawenforcement -12.380 1.927 -6.424 3.14E-10 ***  
mandate*professionallicensing -6.676 2.843 -2.348 0.019256 * 
mandate*substanceabuse -- -- -- --  
Note: This table reports results using the regression equation found on page 14 using opioid overdose deaths 
reported by the Kaiser Family Foundation as the variable of measurement. Fixed effects for years are always 
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Table 6: Questions included in the survey sent to emergency medicine, pain management, and 
primary care physicians. 
 
Survey Questions 
Q1. Do you know what the Prescription Drug Monitoring Program (PDMP) is? 
 Select:  Yes 
  No  
Q2. Do you know the operating agency responsible for managing and implementing Pennsylvania's   
PDMP? 
 Select:  Yes 
  No  
Q3. [IF SELECTED "YES" TO Q2"] Please select the operating agency responsible for managing and 
implementing Pennsylvania's PDMP.  
 Select:  PA Department of Health 
  PA Pharmacy Board 
  PA Substance Abuse Agency 
  PA Law Enforcement 
  PA Consumer Protection Agency 
  PA Professional Licensing Agency 
Q4. [IF SELECTED "NO" TO Q2"] If you were to guess the operating agency responsible for 
managing and implementing Pennsylvania's PDMP, which of the following would you pick? 
 Select:  PA Department of Health 
  PA Pharmacy Board 
  PA Substance Abuse Agency 
  PA Law Enforcement 
  PA Consumer Protection Agency 
  PA Professional Licensing Agency 
Q5. How often do you check and refer to PDMP data before prescribing controlled medications for 
patients (such as opioids or benzodiazepines)? 
 Select:  Always 
  Most of the time 
  About half the time 
  Sometimes 
  Never 
Q6. Have you ever made any mental health or substance abuse referrals, or discharged a patient from 
a prescription after viewing the PDMP? 
 Select:  Yes 
  No  
Q7. How familiar do you perceive you are in understanding the functionalities of the PDMP? (1 being 
NOT familiar, 10 being VERY familiar).  
  Slide option:  1 to 10  
Note: This survey was sent out to participants via Qualtrics survey.  
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Table 7: Survey responses for question one through four regarding general PDMP knowledge 
and operating agency knowledge. 
 
General PDMP Knowledge   Answer Choices 
    Yes No      
  
Q1. Do you know what the 
Prescription Drug Monitoring 
Program (PDMP) is?  
94 (100%) 0 (0%) 
     
           
Operating Agency Knowledge               
    Yes No      
  
Q2. Do you know the operating 
agency responsible for managing 
and implementing Pennsylvania's 
PDMP?  
46 (48.9%) 48 (51.1%) 
     
           

















Q3. [IF SELECTED "YES" TO 
Q2"] Please select the operating 
agency responsible for managing 
and implementing Pennsylvania's 
PDMP.   
41(89.13%) 2 (4.35%) 0 (0%) 2 (4.35%) 1 (2.17%) 0 (0%) 
    
       
  
Q4. [IF SELECTED "NO" TO 
Q2"] If you were to guess the 
operating agency responsible for 
managing and implementing 
Pennsylvania's PDMP, which of 
the following would you pick?  
35 (72.92% 2 (4.17%) 7 (14.58%) 1 (2.08%) 1 (2.08%) 2 (4.17%) 
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Table 8: Survey responses for question five through six regarding physicians’ PDMP 
prescription and usage patterns.  
 
PDMP Prescription Patterns   Answer Choices 
    
Always 




Sometimes Never   
  
Q5. How often do you check and 
refer to PDMP data before 
prescribing controlled 
medications for patients (such as 
opioids or benzodiazepines)?  
62 (65.96%) 22 (23.40%) 3 (3.19%) 6 (6.38%) 1 (1.06%) 
  
    
  
     
    Yes No      
  
Q6. Have you ever made any 
mental health or substance abuse 
referrals, or discharged a patient 
from a prescription after viewing 
the PDMP?  
71 (75.53%) 23 (24.47%) 
     
    
  
     
   Sliding Scale from 1 to 10      
  
Q7. How familiar do you 
perceive you are in understanding 
the functionalities of the PDMP? 
(1 being NOT familiar, 10 being 
VERY familiar).  
 average: 8.085 
     
                  
  





Figure 3: Comparison of response answers to Q3 (answered by respondents who stated they are 
aware of PA’s PDMP operating agency in Q2) and Q4 (answered by respondents who stated they 
are unaware of PA’s PDMP operating agency in Q2).  
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Figure 4: Breakdown of Q5 responses that indicate how often participants check and refer to the 














Always Most of the time About half the
time
Sometimes Never
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
P
h
ys
ic
ia
n
s
